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Gregory Frost-Arnold

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Frost-Arnold

Gregory Frost-ArnoldProfessor of Philosophy

Joined faculty in 2009

Ph.D. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2006
M.A. Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2005
B.A. Philosophy, University of Chicago, 1999

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Contact Information

Delancey HousePhone (315) 781-4509Personal Homepage

Research

Philosophy of Science
History of Analytic Philosophy
Philosophical Logic

Courses Taught

Philosophy of Science

Symbolic Logic

Biomedical Ethics

Monkeys, Morality, and the Mind (1st Year Seminar)

Ancient Greek Philosophy

Language and Mind

History of 20th C. Philosophy

Publications

Book: Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Math, and Science (2013) Monograph with edited translation, Open Court Press.

Articles:

  • “Confused Terms in Ordinary Language,” with James Beebe  (forthcoming) Journal of Logic, Language, and Information
  • “The Ontogeny of Quine’s Ontology: Pythagoreanism, Nominalism, and the Role of Clarity” (forthcoming) Quine: Structure and Ontology, Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Gary Kemp, (eds.), Oxford University Press.
  • “How to Be a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist: The Problem of Misleading Evidence” (2019) Philosophy of Science 86: 906-917.
  • “Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite?” (2019) Synthese 196: 535-551.
  • “When and Why Did People Begin Calling Themselves ‘Analytic Philosophers’?”  (2017) Innovations in the History of Analytic Philosophy, S. LaPointe and C. Pincock (eds.), Palgrave: 27-67.
  • “Can the Pessimistic Induction Be Saved from Semantic Anti-Realism about Scientific Theory?” (2014) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65: 521-548.
  • “Replies to Creath, Ebbs, and Lavers” (Symposium on Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard) (2016) Metascience 25: 43-49.
  • “From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic Anti-Realism” (2011) Philosophy of Science 78: 1131-1142.
  • “Quine’s Evolution from ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of ‘Two Dogmas’” (2011) HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1: 291-316.
  • “The No-Miracles Argument for Realism: Inference to an Unacceptable Explanation” (2010) Philosophy of Science 77: 35-58.
  • “The Identical Rivals Response to Underdetermination” (with P.D. Magnus) (2010) New Waves in Philosophy of Science, Palgrave Macmillan: 112-130.
  • "Tarski's Nominalism" (2008) in New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy Oxford University Press: 225-246.
  • "Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms" (2008) Journal of Philosophical Logic 37: 239-257.
  • "The Large-scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics" (2005) Philosophy of Science 72: 826-838.
  • "How To Be an Anti-reductionist about Developmental Biology" (2004) Biology and Philosophy 19: 75-91.
  • "Was Tarski's Theory of Truth Motivated by Physicalism?" (2004) History and Philosophy of Logic 25: 265-280.

SERVICE PROJECTS

Associate Editor (2011-2018), Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy

Book Reviews Editor (2018- present), Journal for the History of Philosophy of Science

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